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INTRODUCTION
P ARTIES in litigation have a legal duty to preserve evidence that 
they
know is or will be relevant in a foreseeable lawsuit. This duty exists
before the commencement of a proceeding. A party that fails to preserve
such evidence may face a variety of legal penalties pursuant to a concept
called "spoliation." Spoliation is the concealment, "destruction or significant
alteration of evidence, or the failure to preserve property for another's
use . . . in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation."4 Such action is
problematic because it "destroy[s] fairness and justice, for it increases the
risk of an erroneous decision" and the expenses of litigation as the parties
are left to "attempt to reconstruct the destroyed evidence or to develop
other evidence."5
Almost all jurisdictions agree on the general definition of spoliation,6
but the law pertaining to the spoliation of evidence is evolving, and
i Juris Doctor expected May 2011, University of Kentucky College of Law; Bachelor
of Arts in Political Science, magna cum laude, December 2007, University of Kentucky. The
author wishes to thank her husband, parents, and family for their continued patience, support,
and encouragement.
2 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b); Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F3d 583, 591 (4th Cit. zool)
("The duty to preserve evidence arises not only during litigation but also extends to that
period before the litigation when a party reasonably should know that the evidence may be
relevant to anticipated litigation." (citing Kronisch v. United States, 150 F3d II2, 126 (2d Cit.
1998))).
3 Silvesti, 271 F.3d at 591.
4 West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 E3d 776, 779 (2d Cit. 1999) (citation omitted).
5 Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court (In r Interest of Bowyer), 954 P.2d 511, 515
(Cal. 1998).
6 See, e.g., Hodge v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 36o F3d 446, 449-50 (4th Cit. 2004); Brewer v.
Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 E3d 326, 334 (3d Cir. 1995); Evans v. Robbins, 897 F.2d 966,
970 (8th Cir. 1990); Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214,
217 (ist Cit. 1982); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 167 F.R.D. 90, lo (D. Colo.
1996); Foster v. Lawrence Mem'I Hosp., 809 F. Supp. 831, 836 (D. Kan. 1992); Vesta Fire Ins.
Corp. v. Milam & Co. Constr., Inc., 90 So. 2d 84, 93 (Ala. 2004); Willard v. Caterpillar, Inc.,
48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 607, 616 (Ct. App. 1995) overruledby Cedars-Sinai, 954 P.2d 511; Baldridge v.
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variation exists between jurisdictions.' Courts have developed a range of
remedies to impose on parties guilty of spoliation.' The least onerous of
these remedies is a monetary sanction.' For example, a judge may order
the guilty party (often referred to as the "spoliating party") to pay fees
or fines or shift the cost for wasted discovery efforts. 0 A more severe
alternative is an evidentiary sanction: "[a] judge may order preclusion of
evidence, find a waiver of privilege or work-product protection, or issue an
adverse inference instruction to the jury at the conclusion of trial."" The
so-called spoliation inference commands a jury or trier of fact to presume
that the missing evidence would have been harmful or adverse to the guilty
party." Finally, the most punitive sanction is a default judgment against
the spoliating party and a finding that the party or party's counsel is in
contempt of court.
Though limited by procedural constraints, 4 courts inherently have
broad power to impose these sanctions." Courts primarily consider two
factors as most significant in determining whether sanctions are proper
and, accordingly, which sanction is most appropriate.' 6 The first factor is
the degree of culpability." Culpability is defined on the traditional "sliding
scale" encompassing mere negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, bad
faith, and intentional misconduct.'" The second factor is the amount of
prejudice caused to the innocent party."
As a purely conceptual matter, the doctrine of spoliation attaches to
all levels of culpabilityzo and all types of discovery. Recently, the discovery
process has become more complex as many cases now involve discovery
Dir. of Revenue, 82 S.W.3 d 212, 222 (MO. Ct. App. 2002); Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 597 A.2d 543,
550 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. '99'); Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185, 189 (N.M.
1995); Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037, 1038 (Ohio 1993);see also BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1531 (9th ed. 2oog).
7 Eric M. Larsson, Cause of Action for Spoliation of Evidence, 40 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D I, §
1(2009).
8 Panel Discussion, Sanctions in Electronic Discovery Cases: Views from the Judges, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. I, 5-6 (2009).
9 Id. at 5.
to See FED. R. Civ. P37.
II Panel Discussion, supra note 8, at 6 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 37).
12 Vesta Fire Ins. Corp. v. Milam & Co. Constr., 9o So. 2d 84,93 (Ala. 2004).
13 See Panel Discussion, supra note 8, at 6 (citing FED. R. Civ. P 37(b)(2)).
14 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a).
15 Shira A. Scheindlin & Kanchana Wangkeo, Electronic Discovery Sanctions in the Twenty-
First Century, II MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 71, 72 (2004).
16 Id. at 76-77.
17 See id. at 88.
18 See Michael S. Moore, Prima Facie Moral Culpability, 76 B.U. L. REV. 319, 325 (1996).
19 Scheindlin & Wangkeo, supra note 15, at 84.
20 Mead v. Papa Razzi Rest., 84o A.2d Ilo3, I io8 (R.I. 2004).
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of electronically stored information." There are fundamental differences
between electronic discovery and its paper-based predecessor. These
differences dictate that the culpability standards required for an adverse
inference sanction should be altered for electronic discovery. Currently,
jurisdictions are divided as to whether negligent destruction of electronic
evidence should be sufficient to give rise to an inference of adverse
spoliation." These positions should be reconciled and courts should issue
an adverse jury instruction only against a party whose grossly negligent or
intentional behavior caused spoliation of electronic evidence.
Part I of this Note provides a general overview of sanctions that are
commonly associated with the spoliation of evidence. Part II consists of
an in-depth analysis of the adverse inference jury instruction and the
culpability requirements enlisted by each federal circuit. Part III examines
how the advent of electronically stored information has complicated
spoliation. Part IV outlines a more uniform approach to issuing an adverse
inference jury instruction in regard to electronic spoliation. In conclusion,
requiring a culpability level of gross negligence would reduce the excessive
costs and burdens electronic discovery creates.
I. SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE SANCTIONS
English courts have imposed sanctions for spoliation of evidence since
at least the eighteenth century in order to punish litigants, deter them from
engaging in undesirable conduct, or make the injured party whole." In
Armory v. Delamirie, a chimney sweep found a jewel that he left with a
jeweler who subsequently refused to return it. 4 The judge accordingly
allowed an inference that the jewel was "of the finest water" and instructed
jurors that "unless the defendant did produce the jewel . . . they should
presume the strongest against him, and make the value of the best jewels
the measure of their damages."" The jury instruction in Armory v. Delamirie
has been subsequently cited as historical support for the notion that adverse
inference sanctions are designed to be punitive against the guilty party.26
21 See George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal System Adapt?,
RICH. J.L. &TECH., Spring 2007, at 1, 8-9.
22 Compare Mosaid Techs. Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332,337-38 (D.N.J.
2004) (negligence is sufficient for an adverse inference), with Hodge v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
360 F.3d 446, 450 (4th Cir. 2004) ("[Tlhe inference requires a showing that the party knew
the evidence was relevant to some issue at trial and that his willful conduct resulted in its loss
or destruction.").
23 See Armory v. Delamirie, (1721) 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B.) 664; I Str. 505,505 (one of the
earliest known cases involving the issuance of a spoliation adverse inference jury instruction).
24 Id.
2 5 Id.
26 See Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692 Ed 214, 218 (Ist Cir.
1982).
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While it is accepted that judges historically have wide latitude to
impose such punitive sanctions, the authority for the sanctions is unclear."
Some argue that an adverse inference sanction is a traditional discovery
sanction, while others believe it is a rule of evidence." Regardless, most
note that "the distinction between the spoliation [inference] as evidence
law and the imposition of discovery sanctions may be purely theoretical...
. [RIecent judicial opinions indicate there may be a trend towards merging
or considering the two doctrines together."29 Furthermore, the effect of the
distinction appears to be minimal as judges can impose punitive sanctions
as they see fit. 3 0
When imposing sanctions, however, a court should consider that large
fines, shifting costs of discovery, and holding a party in contempt of court
may create a substantial financial burden and cause embarrassment for
both the party and the attorney involved.3 1 Sanctions that exclude evidence
may delay the start of trial or lead to a mistrial, 32 and a default judgment
sanction ends the litigation altogether." Adverse inferences can also be
case-dispositive as they "have a strong tendency to affect the outcome of
the trial." 4 As Judge Shira Scheindlin (United States District Court Judge
for the Southern District of New York and author of the groundbreaking
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC decisions pertaining to issues surrounding
electronic discovery) pointed out, "it is important to note that before
imposing any of these blockbuster sanctions, courts routinely give lesser
sanctions." 6
Courts attempt to ensure that the harshness of the sanction is in
proportion to the severity of the spoliation.3 1 In Welsh v. United States, the
Sixth Circuit explained that sanctions should vary in accordance with the
culpability of the party charged with spoliation." Courts often consider
27 See Larsson, supra note 7.
28 JAMIE S. GORELICK ET AL., DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE § 2.1, at 14 (2010).
29 Id.at 15.
30 See Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wade, 485 F3d 1032, 1035 (8th Cir. 2007); Morris v. Union
Pac. R.R., 373 F 3 d 896, 901 (8th Cir. 2004).
31 Panel Discussion, supra note 8, at 6.
32 Robert D. Brownstone, Preserve or Perish; Destroy or Droven-E-Discovery Morphs into
Electronic Information Management, 8 N.C. J. L. & TECH I, 17 (2oo6).
33 FED. R. Civ. P. 55
34 Panel Discussion, supra note 8, at 6.
35 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I, II, III), 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 22o ER.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake v.
UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
36 Panel Discussion, supra note 8, at 6.
37 See Bonds v. District of Columbia, 93 E3d 8oi, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (When choosing
a proper sanction, the court should consider the "proportionality' between [the] offense and
sanction." (citations omitted)).
38 Welsh v. United States, 844 E2d 1239, 1246 (6th Cir. 1988).
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several factors to ensure this proportionality, including the culpable
mindset of the party charged with spoliation, prejudice to the injured party,
whether the action caused the evidence to be destroyed or lost, the degree
of harm to justice, whether another sanction would be more appropriate,
and whether the attorney or the party's misconduct led to the spoliation. 9
The trier of fact tends to weigh these factors as they see fit, and often gives
the most weight to two factors: the guilty party's culpability and prejudice
to the injured litigant."
Judges typically impose the harshest sanctions when the wronged party
is greatly prejudiced or the party guilty of spoliation acted intentionally. 41
Generally, courts reserve dismissal or default judgment for cases involving
bad faith and willful misconduct.42 Jurisdictions are split as to whether
negligence is sufficient for adverse inference sanctions even though they
are generally outcome determinative. Regardless of the sanction imposed,
courts are afforded wide discretion, and appellate courts frequently
affirm the sanction as long as it falls "'safely within the universe of
suitable' alternatives." 43 Thus, there are no specific and clear culpability
requirements for an adverse inference sanction across jurisdictions.
II. THE SANCTION OF AN ADVERSE INFERENCE JURY INSTRUCTION
The adverse inference jury instruction is a sanction founded on the
"common sense" principle that a party is more likely to destroy evidence
that is harmful to his or her position than evidence that is beneficial to his
or her case." Before issuing an adverse inference jury instruction, a court
must make certain factual findings, including that the evidence at issue
existed, the party charged with spoliation possessed or controlled it, the
evidence is not available to the injured party, actual spoliation is evident,
the need for discovery of the evidence was reasonably foreseeable, the
evidence is relevant, and the loss prejudices the injured party.45 While most
courts also consider the culpability of the party charged with spoliation,
39 MARGARET M. KOESEL & TRACEY L. TURNBULL, SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE: SANCTIONS
AND REMEDIES FOR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL LITIGATION 59-6o (2d ed. 2oo6).
40 See Shaffer v. RWP Grp., Inc., 169 F.R.D. 19, 25 (E.D.N.Y- 1996); Gates Rubber Co. v.
Bando Chem. Indus., 167 F.R.D. 90, 102 (D. Colo. 1996) (citation omitted).
41 Panel Discussion, supra note 8, at 6 (citation omitted).
42 See id. (citations omitted).
43 Jackson v. Harvard Univ., 900 F.2d 464, 469 (1st Cir. 1990) (citation omitted); see also
Nat'l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639,642 (1976).
44 Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 218 (Ist Cit.
1982).
45 See Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 334 (3d Cir. 1995); Evans v.
Robbins, 897 F.2d 966, 970 (8th Cir. 1990); Sarmiento v. Montclair State Univ., 513 F. Supp.
2d 72, 94 (D.N.J. 2007).
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jurisdictions are divided as to the degree of culpability required to issue an
adverse inference instruction.'
A. Jurisdictions That Require a Culpability Level of Gross Negligence or Intent
Some jurisdictions require a showing that the spoliating party acted
with a higher level of culpability than negligence before issuing an adverse
inference jury instruction.4 1 While these courts have applied this standard
for many years, only recently have they attempted to define culpability that
exceeds negligence in the context of sanctions. 48 Judge Scheindlin recently
utilized the following definition of "willful, wanton, and reckless" in
Pension Committee of the University of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of America
Securities, LLC: conduct where "the actor has intentionally done an act of an
unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so
great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow, and which thus
is usually accompanied by a conscious indifference to the consequences." 49
With no consistent definition of willfulness in the past, courts tended to use
a general tort definition of intent to judge a party's behavior, which often
led to variance among judges.so
The rationale behind limiting the use of an adverse inference to only
more culpable spoliation has been explained clearly:
Spoliation involves more than destruction of evidence. Application of
the concept requires an intentional act of destruction. Only intentional
destruction supports the rationale of the rule that the destruction amounts
to an admission by conduct of the weakness of one's case. The spoliation
inference is also said to be an attempt by the courts to penalize acts of
46 Compare Mosaid Techs. Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332, 338 (D.N.J.
2oo4) (negligence is sufficient for an adverse inference), with Hodge v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
36o F.3d 446, 450 (4th Cir. 2004) ("[Tihe inference requires a showing that the party knew
the evidence was relevant to some issue at trial and that his willful conduct resulted in its loss
or destruction.").
47 As is evident in this Note, courts vary in the precise terminology they use when de-
scribing culpable conduct surpassing negligence (often using the terms "willfulness, in-
tent," or "bad faith"). The original language of the courts has been used in order to provide
accuracy while discussing the cases, but all terms are used intermittently throughout this
Note. See Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wade, 485 F-3d 1032, 1035 (8th Cir. 2007) ("intention-
al"); Condrey v. Suntrust Bank of Ga., 431 F.3d 191, 203 (5th Cir. 2005) ("bad faith or bad
conduct"); Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R., 354 E3d 739, 746 (8th Cir. 2oo4) ("intentional");
Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (ioth Cir. 1997) ("bad faith"); Coates v. Johnson
& Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 551 (7th Cir. 1985) ("bad faith"); United States v. Esposito, 771 F.2d
283, 286 (7th Cir. 1985) ("intentional" and "bad faith"); S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Louisville
& Nashville R.R., 695 F.2d 253, 258 (7th Cit. 1982) ("bad faith").
48 Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of America Sec., LLC, 685
E Supp. 2d 456,463 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
49 Id. at 464 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
5o Id. at 463-64.
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bad faith, or that it is based upon public policy, even though not fully
supportable in logic. Spoliation of evidence implies a consciousness of guilt
so that the presumptions to be drawn from such conduct are not limited to
the particular evidence but may pervade the entire case.5
The jurisdictions following this rule reason that, unlike intentionally
destroyed evidence, evidence that is unintentionally destroyed is just as
likely to be favorable to the destroyer as it is to be harmful; inferring the
evidence is unfavorable, thus, may not be appropriate.5 1 Consequently, the
Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits uniformly require intent before
the issuance of an adverse inference sanction."
1. The Eighth Circuit.-The Eighth Circuit is the most often cited circuit
requiring intentional destruction of evidence before issuing an adverse
inference jury instruction.54 In GreyhoundLines, Inc. v. Wade, a bus company
brought an action against a truck driver following an accident in which the
driver rear-ended a bus." The bus was equipped with an electronic control
module that stored information relating to regular functioning." After the
accident, but before the complaint was filed, Greyhound sent the module
to the manufacturer who erased the stored information.s" The court
recognized that the "ultimate focus for imposing sanctions for spoliation
of evidence is the intentional destruction of evidence indicating a desire
to suppress the truth."" Accordingly, the court refused to issue an adverse
inference instruction because Greyhound did not intentionally destroy the
evidence.
5 9
2. The Fifth Circuit.-The Fifth Circuit has expressly adopted the
Eighth Circuit's culpability requirement in issuing the adverse inference
instruction against a spoliating party. In Vick v. Texas Employment
51 9 BARRY A. LINDAHL, IOWA PRACTICE SERIES: CIVIL PRACTICE FORMS §16.9 (201o ed.).
52 Hodge v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 360 E3d 446, 450 (4th Cir. 2004).
53 The circuits were examined in the following order pursuant to the strengths of the
opinions and the prevalence with which cases from that circuit have been cited.
54 See Panel Discussion, supra note 8, at to ("The most well-known case requiring a find-
ing of bad faith before allowing an adverse inference instruction is Stevenson v. Union Pacific
Railrad Co.," 354 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 2oo4)).
55 Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wade, 485 F3d 1032, 1034 (8th Cir. 2007).
56 Id. at 1034.
57 Id. at 1034-35.
58 Id. at 1035 (citation omitted).
59 Id.
6o Panel Discussion, supra note 8, at 10 ("Many courts, particularly in the Fifth Circuit,
have joined the Eighth Circuit in requiring a finding of bad faith before the imposition of an
adverse inference instruction."); see Condrey v. Suntrust Bank of Ga., 431 F.3d 191, 203 (5th
Cir. 2oo5) ("The Fifth Circuit permits an adverse inference against the destroyer of evidence
only upon a showing of 'bad faith' or 'bad conduct."' (citation omitted)).
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Commission, a woman brought an action alleging sexual discrimination
after the Texas Employment Commission denied her unemployment
compensation benefits during the final stages of her pregnancy and for the
six weeks after the delivery of her child.6 ' In accordance with the Texas
Employment Commission's policy of disposing of inactive records, Vick's
records were destroyed before the trial. 62 The court ruled against Vick's
argument for an adverse inference, stating that the "circumstances of the
act must manifest bad faith. Mere negligence is not enough, for it does not
sustain an inference of consciousness of a weak case."6
3. The Seventh Circuit.-The Seventh Circuit also requires intent before
granting the adverse inference sanction for spoliation." In S.C. Johnson &
Son, Inc. v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., a manufacturer brought a
suit against the railroad company after its products allegedly froze during
shipment and harmed the goods.65 After inspecting the allegedly frozen
products upon arrival and typing up a memorandum regarding the state
of the frozen goods, an employee of the manufacturer destroyed his
handwritten notes." The court considered whether the lower court erred
when it issued an adverse inference that the destruction of the handwritten
notes should imply that the manufacturer's employee did not properly
sample the goods.67 The appeals court explained:
The [lower] court based this inference on the maxim omnia praesumuntur
contra spoliatorem, application of which involves a two step process. First
the court must be of the opinion from the fact that a party has destroyed
evidence that the party did so in bad faith. Only then may the court
infer from this state of mind that the contents of the evidence would be
unfavorable to that party if introduced in court. The crucial element is not
that the evidence was destroyed but rather the reason for the destruction.'
The court found that the facts did not support the inference because
the employee's actions did not constitute bad faith, indicating that mere
negligence is not sufficient culpability for the sanction in the Seventh
Circuit.69
61 Vick v. Tex. Emp't Comm'n, 514 F.2d 734, 735 (5th Cir. 1975).
62 Id. at 737.
63 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64 See United States v. Esposito, 771 E2d 283, 286 (7th Cir. 1985); Coates v. Johnson &
Johnson, 756 F2d 524, 551 (7th Cir. 1985); S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R., 695 F.2d 253, 258-59 (7th Cir. 1982).
65 S.C. Johnson & Son, 695 F.2d at 255.
66 Id. at 256.
67 Id. at 258.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 259.
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4. The Tenth Circuit.-The Tenth Circuit also requires bad faith destruction
of evidence before it will issue an adverse inference sanction.70 In Aramburu
v. Boeing Co., a man sued his employer for alleged discrimination stemming
from both his Mexican-American heritage and his disability of carpal tunnel
syndrome." The former employee alleged an adverse inference instruction
was appropriate against the company because the employer was unable to
produce his 1991 employment record.n The Tenth Circuit, recognizing it
was setting new precedent for the circuit, relied on the above Eighth, Fifth,
and Seventh Circuit decisions to hold that bad faith is generally required
for an adverse inference jury instruction." The Tenth Circuit explained,
"[wihile this testimony shows that [Aramburu's supervisor] lost certain
of Aramburu's attendance records for 1991, it does not show that he did
so in bad faith"; thus, an adverse inference jury instruction was deemed
inappropriate.14
B. Jurisdictions That Require Nothing More Than Ordinary Negligence
Several jurisdictions allow adverse inference jury instructions to be
imposed even when a party has breached his or her discovery duties through
nothing more than ordinary negligence." A definition of negligence used
by Judge Scheindlin is
conduct "which falls below the standard established by law for the protection
of others against unreasonable risk of harm." [Negligence] is caused by
heedlessness or inadvertence, by which the negligent party is unaware of
the results which may follow from [its] act. But it may also arise where the
negligent party has considered the possible consequences carefully, and has
exercised [its] own best judgment.
... A failure to conform to this standard is negligent even if it results from a
pure heart and an empty head. 6
An adverse inference instruction for merely negligent spoliation has been
premised on the belief that it is "common sense . . . that a party . . . who
proceeds to destroy the document is more likely to have been threatened
by the document than is a party in the same position who does not destroy
70 See Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 E3d 1398, 1407 (1oth Cir. 1997).
71 Id. at 1401.
72 Id. at 1407.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 See Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 3o6 E3d 99, 1o8 (2d Cir. 2002).
76 Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of America Sec., LLC, 685
E Supp. 2d 456,463-64 (S.D.N.Y. zoo) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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the document."n The Second and Ninth Circuits both apply this lesser
standard.
1. The Second Circuit.-A mere negligence standard is sufficient for an
adverse inference instruction in the Second Circuit. 8 This circuit has
expressly held that courts "ha[ve] broad discretion in fashioning an
appropriate sanction, including . . . an adverse inference instruction ...
[that] may be imposed where a party has breached a discovery obligation
not only through bad faith or gross negligence, but also through ordinary
negligence."" For example, in Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge
Financial Corp., the court considered the issue of an adverse inference after
a party breached its discovery obligation to produce specific emails in time
for trial."o The court utilized a three-factor test to determine whether an
adverse inference was appropriate: (1) whether "the party having control
over the evidence had an obligation to ... produce it"; (2) whether the lack
of production was the result of a "culpable state of mind"; and (3) whether
the evidence was "relevant.""
The court stated, however, that the "'culpable state of mind' factor [can
be] satisfied by a showing that the evidence was destroyed 'knowingly,
even if without intent to [breach a duty to preserve it], or negligently.' 82
The court rationalized that an adverse inference jury instruction may be
appropriate when conduct was merely negligent because each party should
"bear the risk" of its own negligent acts.83 The court relied on the words of
Magistrate Judge Francis:
[The] sanction [of an adverse inference] should be available even for
the negligent destruction of documents if that is necessary to further the
remedial purpose of the inference. It makes little difference to the party
victimized by the destruction of evidence whether that act was done willfully
or negligently. The adverse inference provides the necessary mechanism for
restoring the evidentiary balance. The inference is adverse to the destroyer
not because of any finding of moral culpability, but because the risk that the
evidence would have been detrimental rather than favorable should fall on
the party responsible for its loss. 4
77 Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 218 (ist Cir.
1982).
78 See, e.g., Panel Discussion, supra note 8, at lo.
79 Residential Funding, 3o6 F3d at Io.
8o Idat 101-02.
81 Id. at 107 (internal quotation marks omitted).
82 Id. at io8 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
83 Id.
84 Id. (quoting Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(alteration in original)).
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The Second Circuit's three-part test for deciding if negligent behavior
should be punished with an adverse inference sanction is influential
precedent that has since been adopted by federal district courts in at least
two circuits."
2. The Ninth Circuit.-The Ninth Circuit joins the Second Circuit in allowing
negligence to justify an adverse inference instruction.8 In Glover v. BIC
Corp., a products liability case, the Ninth Circuit recognized courts' broad
power to issue adverse sanctions that they deem appropriate, even without
a finding of bad faith.87 Numerous district courts in the Ninth Circuit have
expressly adopted the Second Circuit's factors to determine whether an
adverse inference sanction is appropriate.8 8
C. Trend Towards Sanctioning Mere Negligent Destruction
It appears "[tihe current trend is to sanction even unintentional-
but-negligent destruction or untimely productions."" Despite previous
appellate decisions within circuits that required intent or willfulness,
several district courts are lowering the requisite level of culpability to
negligence."
1. The Third Circuit.-The Third Circuit historically required intent on
behalf of the party charged with spoliation before granting an adverse
inference sanction. 91 For example, in Brewer v. Quaker Statel Oil Refining
Corp., the plaintiff sued his former employer for allegedly violating the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, among other claims.92 The district
85 World Courier v. Barone, No. C o6-3072 TEH, 2007 WL i119196, at *i (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 16, 2007).
86 See Glover v. BIC Corp., 6 F.3 d 1318, 1329 (9th Cir. 1993) (granting adverse inference
against a party who destroyed evidence that had "'potential relevance to the litigation"');
World Courier, 2007 WL i 119196, at *2 (citing Second Circuit precedent in approving a neg-
ligence standard).
87 Glover, 6 F.3d at 1329.
88 World Courier, 2007 WL i 19196, at *I.
89 Brownstone, supra note 32, at 18; see also M. Bryan Schneider, AnnualSurvey ofMic/sigan
Law, 52 WAYNE L. REv. 661, 681 (2oo6) ("The more modern trend, however, is that 'a finding
of 'bad faith' or 'evil motive' is not a prerequisite to imposition of sanctions for destruction of
evidence."') (quoting Baliotis v. McNeil, 870 F. Supp. 1285, 1291 (M.D. Pa. 1994)).
go See infra Part II.D.
91 See Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F3 d 326,334 (3d Cir. 1995) ("The gener-
al principles concerning the inferences to be drawn from the loss or destruction of documents
are well established." An "inference arises ... only when the spoliation or destruction [of
evidence] was intentional, and indicates fraud and a desire to suppress the truth, and it does
not arise where the destruction was a matter of routine with no fraudulent intent." (second
alteration in.original ) (citation omitted) (internal citations omitted)).
92 Id. at 329.
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court granted summary judgment in favor of his employer, Quaker State
Oil Refining Corp.93 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the district court
erred when it refused to sanction Quaker State for its inability to produce
the plaintiffs personnel file from previous years. 4 The Third Circuit
upheld the lower court's decision and recognized "[sluch a presumption or
inference arises . .. only when the spoliation or destruction [of evidence]
was intentional, and indicates fraud and a desire to suppress the truth, and
it does not arise where the destruction was a matter of routine with no
fraudulent intent."1s
Yet, recent district court decisions in the Third Circuit have held that
negligence is sufficient to demonstrate the culpability requirement for
an adverse inference sanction.' In CentiMark Corp. v. Pegnato & Pegnato
Roof Management, the plaintiff requested the production of specific key
documents that the defendant failed to produce.97 The district court
analyzed the requisite level of culpability and determined that although
it is not clear whether the Third Circuit intended to require bad faith,
"several courts within the Third Circuit have found that it does not, and
have found that even negligent destruction of evidence is sufficient to give
rise to the spoliation inference."'
2. The Fourth Circuit.-The Fourth Circuit also appears to be wavering on
which level of culpability is necessary to impose an adverse inference. 9 In
Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., the Fourth Circuit held that an adverse
inference "cannot be drawn merely from . . . negligent loss or destruction
of evidence; the inference requires a showing that the party knew the
evidence was relevant to some issue at trial and that his willful conduct
resulted in its loss or destruction." 00
In Hodgev. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., a customer brought a negligence action
against the retailer Wal-Mart for damages after mirrors fell off an upper shelf
of a display and landed on the customer.'01 The customer claimed Wal-Mart
deliberately failed to question witnesses to the accident and requested an
93 Id.
94 Id. at 334-
95 Id. (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
96 CentiMark Corp. v. Pegnato & Pegnato Roof Mgmt., Inc., No. 05-7o8, 2oo8 WL
1995305, at *io (W.D. Pa. May 6, 2oo8); Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. v. Cooper Crouse-Hinds,
LLC, No. o5 -CV-639 9 , 2007 WL 2571450, at *7 n-35 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2007); Mosaid Techs.,
Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 348 E Supp. 2d 332, 337-38 (D.N.J. 2004).
97 Centibark, 2oo8 WL 1995305, at *4.
98 Id. at *io (citing Mosaid, 348 F Supp. 2d at 337-38).
99 See Hodge v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 360 F3d 446, 450 (4th Cir. 2004); Vodusek v.
Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F3d 148, 156 (4 th Cit. 1995).
'oo Vodusek, 71 F3d at 156.
iol Hodge, 36o E3d at 448,
892 [Vol. 99
ADVERSE INFERENCE SANCTION
adverse inference for the spoliation of this evidence.'o "The district court
granted summary judgment to Wal-Mart."1 0 3 The Fourth Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision, finding insufficient evidence of the intentional
culpability necessary to permit a conclusion that the Wal-Mart employees'
"actions constituted a willful loss of evidence resulting in an abuse of the
judicial process, such as would warrant a finding of spoliation."'"
However, other decisions from the Fourth Circuit have upheld mere
negligence as sufficient, even justifying the sanction of dismissal. 0 In
Silvestri v. General Motors Corp., a motorist sued the automobile giant
General Motors, alleging that his airbag did not deploy as warranted and
caused more severe injuries than otherwise would have been suffered
during an accident.'" After the accident, the motorist employed two
accident investigators and then turned the wrecked vehicle over to his
insurance company, which sold the vehicle to a third party.' Thus, the
motorist no longer possessed the evidence and was unable to produce
the car during discovery. 0 The court dismissed the motorist's lawsuit as
a result, holding that although the "conduct is less culpable, dismissal may
be necessary if the prejudice to the defendant is extraordinary, denying
it the ability to adequately defend its case."' 9 A district court within the
Fourth Circuit has also expressly relied on the Second Circuit to find that
ordinary negligence is sufficient to demonstrate a culpable state of mind for
an adverse inference jury instruction."i0
3. The Eleventh Circuit.-Although the Eleventh Circuit initially adopted
the approach taken in the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, requiring bad faith for
the issuance of an adverse inference, district courts within the Eleventh
Circuit have recently accepted mere negligence."' In Bashirv. Amtrak, the
father of a pedestrian who was struck and killed by a train in a pedestrian
crossing brought a claim for wrongful death against the railroad."' The
railroad company failed to preserve the portion of speed recorder tape that
102 Id.
io3 Id.
104 Id. at 451.
105 Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 E3d 583, 593 (4th Cit. 200); Teague v. Target
Corp., No. 3 :o6CVi91, 2007 WL 104i191, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 4, 2007).
io6 Silvestri, 271 E3d at 585.
107 Id. at 586-87.
io8 Id. at 587.
109 Id. at 593.
i o Teague, 2oo7 WL 1041i91, at *2 (citing Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin.
Corp., 3o6 F3d 99, 107-o8 (2d Cir. 2002)).
iii See Brown v. Chertoff, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1381 (S.D. Ga. 2oo8). But see Slattery v.
Precision Response Corp., 167 F. App'x 139, 141 (i ith Cit. 20o6); Bashir v. Amtrak, 119 F.3d
929,931 (iith Cir. 1997).
'12 Bashir, I i9 F.3d at 930.
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would have documented the train's speed at the time of the accident."'
The Eleventh Circuit considered whether the loss of this tape warranted
an adverse inference jury instruction.1 14 The court held that "under the
'adverse inference rule,' [the court would] not infer that the missing speed
tape contained evidence unfavorable to appellees unless the circumstances
surrounding the tape's absence indicate bad faith, e.g., that appellees
tampered with the evidence.""'s
In Slattery v. Precision Response Corp., a woman brought an action
against her employer under the Equal Pay Act."6 After the employer's
alleged failure to produce specific documents during discovery, the female
employee filed a motion for an adverse inference jury instruction."' The
court held that an adverse inference for spoliation is permitted in the
Eleventh Circuit only on a predication of bad faith, not mere negligence."'
Nevertheless, in Brown v. Chertoff a District Court in the Southern
District of Georgia held that mere negligence is sufficient to warrant an
adverse inference instruction for spoliation.'19 A former employee brought
an action for employment discrimination against the Department of
Homeland Security.12 0 The employee sought sanctions after the defendant
failed to produce notes because the entire file had been destroyed, along
with all closed disciplinary case files, as a routine cost saving measure."'
The court recognized the defendant's actions were merely negligent and
did not constitute bad faith but granted an adverse inference sanction
because it concluded the level of culpability was only one factor to be
weighed against prejudice.'
D. The First Circuit's Approach
The First Circuit takes the most distinctive approach in that it does
not expressly require the fact-finder to consider any particular degree
of culpability when issuing sanctions.' Instead, the party requesting
the adverse inference must only show the spoliating party "knew of (a)
113 Id. at 930-31.
I14 Id. at 931.
115 Id.
II6 Slatery, 167 F.App'x at 140.
117 Id.at 141.
I18 Id. (citation omitted).
i19 Brown v. Chertoff, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1381 (S.D. Ga. 2008).
120 Id.at 1374.
121 Id.at 1377.
122 Id.at 1381.
123 Testa v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 E3d 173, 177 (ist Cir. 1998); Blinzler v. Marriott
Int'l, Inc., 8i F3d 1148, 1158-59 (ist Cir. 1996); Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills
Distribs., Inc., 692 E2d 214, 218 (1st Cir. 1982).
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the claim . . ., and (b) the document's potential relevance to that claim;"
upon that showing, "a trier of fact may (but need not) infer from a party's
obliteration of a document relevant to a litigated issue that the contents of
the document were unfavorable to that party." 124
Thus, in the First Circuit, courts are free to impose a spoliation inference
jury instruction based on the actions of the party charged with spoliation
with no regard for the level of culpability.' In Nation-Wide Check Corp. v.
Forest Hills Distributors, Forest Hill's attorney allowed records that could
have proven an important fact at trial to be destroyed despite being on
notice of the pending litigation.' 6 The First Circuit was reluctant to label
the attorney's actions as "bad faith." But, it held "bad faith" should not be the
test for whether adverse inference sanctions should be applied.' Rather,
the court rejected a minimum culpability standard and held that "the trier
of fact generally may receive the fact of the document's nonproduction or
destruction as evidence that the party which has prevented production did
so out of the well-founded fear that the contents would harm him."'
The First Circuit reaffirmed the holding of Nation-Wide Check Corp. in
Sacramona v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. when the court rejected Sacramona's
defense that any destruction was not done in bad faith.'2 9 The court
recognized that "bad faith is a proper and important consideration ....
But bad faith is not essential. If such evidence is mishandled through
carelessness, and the other side is prejudiced, we think that the district
court is entitled to consider imposing sanctions ....
E. The Sixth Circuit's Approach
It is uncertain whether negligent actions are sufficient to justify an
adverse inference sanction in the Sixth Circuit."' In Welsh v. United States,
the Sixth Circuit considered an action brought under the Federal Tort
Claims Act after a man died of bacterial meningitis following brain surgery
in a Veterans Administration hospital.'32 Although claims brought under
federal statutes generally are considered federal questions so that courts
almost exclusively apply federal law, the Federal Tort Claims Act provides
124 Testa, 144 E3d at 177 (citations omitted).
125 See Nation-Wide Check Corp., 692 F.2d at 218.
126 Id. at 219.
127 Id.
I28 Id.at 217.
129 Sacramona v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., io6 F.3d 444,447 (ist Cit. 1997).
130 Id. at 447 (citations omitted).
131 See Adkins v. Wolever, 554 F3d 650, 651 (6th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (overruling Beck v.
Haik, 377 E3d 624, 641 (6th Cir. 2004), Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174
F.3d 8oi, 804 (6th Cir 1999), and Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239, 1245 (6th Cir. 1988)).
132 Welsh, 844 F.zd at 1239.
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that liability should be "determined in accordance with the law of the state
where the event giving rise to liability occurred.""' The court in Welsh
recognized, therefore, that liability was to be determined under Kentucky
law.34
The Welsh court did not, however, limit its application of state law
merely to liability. Instead, the court also applied Kentucky law to the
issue of imposing an adverse inference sanction, explaining only that "in
this Tort Claims Act case our task, as in diversity [jurisdiction cases]," is to
determine and apply the relevant state law.' The court did not explain
why it was expanding the congressional command that state law govern
liability issues to the issue of sanctions.'3 6
The application of state law to determine whether an adverse inference
sanction was appropriate became the standard within the Sixth Circuit
after Welsh. This standard failed to receive further analysis, including
examination through the Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins paradigm which
asks whether the law being analyzed is procedural or substantive. Such
an analysis is traditionally done in cases brought in federal courts under
diversity of citizenship."' For example, in the diversity case of Nationwide
Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Ford Motor Co., the Sixth Circuit merely cited
to Welsh in holding that "rules that apply to the spoiling of evidence and the
range of appropriate sanctions are defined by state law.""' In the federal
question case of Beck v. Haik, the Sixth Circuit cited Nationwide Mutual
Fire Insurance and utilized Michigan state law in determining whether an
adverse inference sanction was appropriate.' 9 Thus, the Welsh line of cases
led to differing results within the Sixth Circuit depending on the state in
which the court was located."o For instance, Ohio state law requires bad
faith, or at least gross negligence, to permit a spoliation inference,141 while
133 Young v. United States, 7 F3d 1238 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674
(1988) and Friedman v. United States, 927 F.2d 259, 261 (6th Cir. 1991)).
134 Welsh, 844 F2d at 1243.
135 Id. at 1245.
I36 Id.
137 See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie sets forth that cases
arising under diversity jurisdiction (those in which the citizen of one state sues the citizen of
another seeking damages that exceed a prescribed amount), federal courts are to apply the
substantive state law of the state in which the court is sitting. Under this analysis, courts hear-
ing diversity of citizenship cases will first determine whether an issue is a matter of substan-
tive or procedural law. If the matter is determined to be substantive, the court is required to
apply the law of the state in which it is sitting, as if it is a state court of that state. If the matter
is determined to be a procedural matter, then the court will apply the appropriate federal law.
138 Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 F3d 8oi, 804 (6th Cir. 1999).
139 Beck v. Haik, 377 E3d 624,641 (6th Cir. 2004).
140 Compare Sullivan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 772 F. Supp. 358, 364 (N.D. Ohio 1991), with
Roskam Baking Co. v. Lanham Mach. Co., 71 F Supp. 2d 736, 749 (W.D. Mich. 1999).
141 Sullivan, 772 F. Supp. at 364.
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in Michigan, mere negligence is sufficient to allow an adverse inference
jury instruction.'42
In Adkins v. Wolever, the Sixth Circuit revisited the law created in
Welsh.143 In Adkins, a Michigan prisoner sued a prison corrections officer for
alleged assault under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.'" Video footage was made relating
to the incident, and shortly after the assault, prison officials took color
photographs of the prisoner's injuries.145 Prison officials, however, were
unable to produce either the footage or the original colored photographs
during discovery, claiming they had been lost or destroyed.'46 The prisoner
asked the court to instruct the jury on adverse inference because the
documents could not be produced.' 47 The district court applied Michigan
state law and refused to give the adverse inference instruction.' 48 The
plaintiff prisoner appealed to the Sixth Circuit.149
During the Sixth Circuit's en banc review, the court was cognizant of the
fact that it was the only circuit to apply state law to federal cases brought
under either diversity or federal question claims and reversed the Welsh line
of cases.so The en banc court recognized that a federal court is not bound
by state laws when imposing sanctions for the spoliation of evidence."s
The court explained it was making this change for two reasons: "First,
the authority to impose sanctions for spoliated evidence arises . . .'from a
court's inherent power to control the judicial process.' Second, a spoliation
ruling is evidentiary in nature and federal courts generally apply their own
evidentiary rules in both federal question and diversity matters."Isz While
the court created a new standard within the Sixth Circuit that is more in
line with the other circuits, it failed to define the level of culpability it will
require for an adverse inference instruction.' Instead, the court merely
hinted that the severity of the spoliation sanction may correspond to the
level of culpability and "the party's fault."15
142 Roskam Baking Co., 71 F Supp. 2d at 749.
143 Adkins v. Wolever, 554 F 3 d 65o, 651 (6th Cir. 2oo9).
144 Id. at 651-52.
145 Id. at 652.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 See Adkins v. Wolever, 52o F3d 585,587-88 (6th Cir. 2oo8), vacated, 554 F.3d 650 (6th
Cir. 2009).
150 Adkins, 554 F3d at 652 ("In contrast to our persistent application of state law in this
area, other circuits apply federal law for spoliation sanctions." (citations omitted)).
151 Seeid.at651.
152 Id. at 652 (citations omitted).
153 Id. at 652-53.
154 Id.
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After Adkins v. Wolever, the district courts in the Sixth Circuit are left
to speculate as to the level of culpability the Sixth Circuit will adopt."ss In
Dilts v. Maxim Crane Works, the Eastern District of Kentucky recognized
a current split among the districts within the Sixth Circuit with regard to
the level of culpability required.'16 For example, it appears as though the
Eastern and Western Districts of Tennessee and the Eastern District of
Michigan align more with the reasoning of the Second Circuit in allowing
an adverse inference for merely negligent conduct."s' Meanwhile, the
Southern District of Ohio requires bad faith before imposing an adverse
inference sanction. 5 8
III. THE CIRCUIT STANDARDS ON CULPABILITY IN RELATION TO THE DIGITAL
WORLD
As evidenced, there is a sharp divide among circuits regarding the
level of culpability required for an adverse inference jury instruction. To
complicate matters further, the nature of discovery has changed in light
of technological development."' The phenomenon of electronic discovery
has entirely altered the practice: "While 20 years ago [personal computers]
were a novelty and email did not exist, [in 2002,] by some estimates more
than 90 percent of all information is created in an electronic format." 60
Discovery issues have become more complex because of the "significant
differences between paper and electronic information in terms of structure,
content and volume."' 6'
The most significant difference between traditional and electronic
discovery (also called e-discovery) is the sheer quantity of electronically
155 Dilts v. Maxim Crane Works, L.P., No. 07-38, 2oo9 WL 3161362, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Sept.
28, 2009).
156 Dilts, 2009WL 3161362, at *3. In Dilts, the court did not resolve which level of cul-
pability the Eastern District of Kentucky will apply. Instead, the court considered first the
threshold question of whether "Dilts has produced sufficient evidence that Maxim's conduct
allegedly leading to the spoliation of the evidence at issue was at least negligent." Id. The
court held that Maxim's actions were not negligent and thus did not meet any threshold re-
quirement for culpability to grant an adverse inference sanction. Id. at *3-4.
157 See Smith v. USF Holland, Inc., No. 3:o7-CV-15o, 2009 WL 2170136, at *6 (E.D.
Tenn. July 20, 2009); BancorpSouth Bank v. Herter, 643 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1059-60 (W.D. Tenn.
2oo9); Forest Labs., Inc. v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., No. o6-CV-13143, 2009 WL 998402, at
*5-6 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 14, 2009).
158 In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., NO. 2:03-md-1565, 2009 WL 2169174, at *3
(S.D. Ohio July 16, 2009).
159 THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES
RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 4
(20o5).
16o Id. at I.
161 Id. at iii.
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stored information and the difficulty of deleting it.' Because of the vast
storage capacity of electronic systems, more records may be saved, and
retrieving those records can be expensive when new technology renders
the prior system obsolete.' To place the volume into perspective, a single
corporation could possess more than 10,000 backup tapes of potentially
relevant information." Each tape can hold as much as one trillion bytes
(one terabyte), which, if converted to paper format, means each tape would
be equivalent to a stack of paper that is 200 miles high.' 6s Furthermore, the
difficulty of retrieving documents that are stored in a.variety of locations
and are complicated to access increases the cost of discovery.'" Because
of the sheer volume of electronic data, the traditional method of manual
searching is almost impossible. 167 The change in storage format from paper
to electronic data forces most parties to rely on statistical searches of their
data using keyword and language searches to locate relevant documents."
Another major difference between traditional and electronic discovery
is that the manner and content of the electronic data is constantly changing,
leading to the inadvertent storage of multiple drafts or to metadata disputes,
which are uncommon with tangible discovery.'16 Additionally, the location
of the data can be on a variety of electronic media, including a traditional
office desktop computer, a home computer, personal digital assistants
(PDAs), laptops, flash drives, "telephone calls placed over the internet
through voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), smart cards," email, outside or
internet data store facilities, and cell phones.170
These differences between paper and electronic data cause concern
when courts treat electronic discovery and traditional discovery similarly in
terms of sanctions. For example, "traditional spoliation doctrine assumes"
that the failure to produce, or the destruction of, evidence is indicative of
intent to withhold adverse information."' However, this assumption is not
necessarily true of electronic discovery given that it is stored differently
162 Id. at 3.
163 Id. at 4.
164 JAMES N. DERTOUZOS ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, THE LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: OPrIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 1-2
(2oo8), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional-papers/OP 183.
165 Id.
166 'ME SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 159, at 4-5.
167 See Paul & Baron, supra note 2 1, at 48.
168 See id. at 47.
169 Metadata is "information about the document or file that is recorded by the com-
puter to assist the computer and often the user in storing and retrieving the document or file at
a later date.... Much metadata is not normally accessible by the computer user." THE SEDONA
CONFERENCE, supra note 159, at 5.
170 DERTOUZOS ET AL., supra note 164, at 1-2.
171 Thomas Y. Allman, Defining Culpability: The Searh for a Limited Safe Harbor in
Electronic Discovery, 2 FED. CTS. L. REV. 65, 70 (2007).
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and is easily lost as a matter of efficient recycling of data or an uninformed
user's oversight.'72 Because of these differences and the significant potential
problems they pose for spoliation in electronic discovery, resolving this
issue has become important."' In 2002, individuals throughout the legal
profession came together at a meeting, known as the Sedona Conference,
to discuss these differences and attempt to resolve the problems posed
by electronic discovery. 174 The Sedona Conference recommendation
pertaining to sanctions was that
[slanctions, including spoliation findings, should only be considered by the
court if, upon a showing of a clear duty to preserve, the court finds that
there was an intentional or reckless failure to preserve and produce relevant
electronic data and that there is a reasonable probability that the loss of the
evidence has materially prejudiced the adverse party."'s
In response, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee amended the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in 2006 and added what is now Rule 37(e), which
provides that courts should not impose sanctions "for failing to provide
electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith
operation of an electronic information system."'7 6 Although earlier drafts
expressly included a negligence standard and then, in an alternative
version, a reckless or intentional culpability standard, the final version
omitted this language to allow the courts "flexibility" in issuing sanctions
when the injured party is severely prejudiced."' The drafters included a
"good faith" standard because it was their belief that "[g]ood faith lies at
a point intermediate between negligence and recklessness.""' Although
good faith is not defined by the text of the rule or in the official comments,
one drafter summarized the concept: good faith "assumes [the party] did
not deliberately use the system's routine destruction functions. 'If you
know it will disappear and do nothing, that is not good faith.' .. 'The
line is conscious awareness the system will destroy information.""' 9 While
this language is an attempt to provide guidance, the use of a "good faith"
standard is problematic because the "flexible" language has only created
172 Id. at 70-7 1 (2007).
173 See id. at 71-72.
174 See THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 159, at ii.
175 Id. at 13.
176 FED. R. Civ. P 37(e).
177 See Memorandum from Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Advisory Comm. on
Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, to Honorable David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules
of Practice & Procedure 85 (May 27, 2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV5-2oo5.pdf.
178 CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., MINUTES OF THE APRIL MEETING 42 (D.C. Meeting
Apr. 14-15, 2005), available at www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/
CRACo4o5.pdf;seealso Memorandum, supra note 177, at 18.
179 CIvIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., Supra note 178, at 42.
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discovery disputes over what constitutes "'routine, good-faith operation,"'
and courts are forced to spend a great deal of time sorting out the definition
of good faith.'
This failure to define a clear level of culpability within Federal Rule
37(e) appears to be at odds with the purpose of the amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which were designed to provide national
uniformity in the civil rules regarding electronic discovery and prevent
"uncertainty, expense, delays, and burdens.""' Further, the issue becomes
more muddled for the courts because Federal Rule 37(e) provides an
additional exception to this "good faith routine operation" standard if
there are "exceptional circumstances," but the rule does not provide any
explanation or example of what constitutes an exceptional circumstance.8 ,
Finally, there is evidence that the courts have "imposed sanctions for
considerably less-culpable conduct than [Federal Rule 37] was meant
to target."' Thus, while Federal Rule 37(e) attempts to address the
problems associated with the destruction of electronic evidence, it is clear
that Federal Rule 37(e) fails to eliminate the different levels of scienter
various circuits require before imposing an adverse inference sanction.
IV. A MORE UNIFORM APPROACH is NECESSARY
Discovery is a fundamental cornerstone of the civil judicial process in
the United States," and with the advent of electronic communications and
storage, the way in which attorney and clients conduct discovery appears to
be forever changed.' Despite appeals to alter the spoliation standard for
electronic discovery, circuits continue to apply the same standard as that
applicable to paper discovery.'"' Even the legislative attempt to achieve
a national approach for electronic discovery, as discussed above, failed
to create a uniform approach, among all circuits, regarding the level of
culpability required for the imposition of sanctions.'
i8o Ryan J. Reaves, The Dangers of E-Discovery and the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
3 Okla. J. L. & Tech. 32, 38-39 (2007).
181 COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, SUMMARY REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE 83 (September 2005), available at www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/
rules/Reports/STo9-2005.pdf.
182 FED. R. Civ. P 37(e).
183 Andrew Hebi, Spoliation of Electronically Stored Information, Good Faith, and Rule
37(e), 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 79, 85 (2o8).
184 DERTOUZOS, supra note 164, at I.
185 See id. at I-2.
186 THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 159, at I.
187 See id. at 7.
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An adverse inference sanction has a strong influence on the outcome
of the case.'" Considered one of the most severe sanctions, "most judges
are keenly aware . . . that the adverse inference instruction can have a
devastating impact on the party" accused of spoliation.'" Because these
sanctions have a serious impact on the determination of the case, courts
should consider that the nature of discovery has drastically changed.'"
A strict application of stare decisis ignores the truth that "assumptions
about how potential evidence is lost in the world of tangible things do not
necessarily apply in an electronic environment.""'
Because of the wide range of standards used to issue an adverse inference
sanction, litigants feel forced to decide between needlessly preserving
excessive amounts of electronically stored information at great burden and
expense or later having to compromise lawful claims or defenses.192 This
dilemma and "the uncertainty surrounding the culpability issue threaten[]
to impede and prevent the adoption of rational business policies."'"9
As the intent of Federal Rule 37(e) and the Sedona Principles suggest,
all courts should alter the culpability standard for an adverse inference
jury instruction to require at least grossly negligent conduct in the context
of electronic discovery. Judge Scheindlin recently utilized the following
definition of gross negligence: "a failure to exercise even that care which a
careless person would use.... [G]ross negligence is something more than
negligence and differs from ordinary negligence only in degree, and not in
kind." "9
In addition to achieving uniformity and balance among courts, the
requirement of gross negligence would alleviate some pressure on parties to
spend an inordinate amount of resources in an attempt to avoid sanctions.19
The vast amount of electronic data, the possible difficulty of recovery,
various storage locations, and the recycling nature of the data storage all
increase the potential for loss, destruction, or overlooking of electronic
discovery that is not as prevalent with traditional discovery.'96 Because
of this, many advocate for a willful or intentional level of culpability to
alleviate the fear of inadvertently destroying evidence.'"9 They believe
188 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC (Zubulake IV), 22o F.R.D. 212, 219-20 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
189 Panel Discussion, supra note 8, at 7-8.
190 See ThE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 159, at 1-3.
191 See Allman, supra note 171, at 70 (citation omitted).
192 Id. at 72.
193 Id. (citation omitted).
194 Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of America Sec., LLC, 685
F. Supp. ad 456,464 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
195 See Allman,supra note 171, at 72.
196 See'I1E SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 159, at 7.
197 See Memorandum, supra note 177, at 83-89.
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that because an adverse inference sanction is often determinative of the
outcome of a lawsuit, such a strong sanction should be reserved for truly
culpable actions. 198 However, a requirement of gross negligence achieves
the same goal because the heightened level of culpability would prevent a
party from losing her case merely because of thoughtless conduct.
Furthermore, a gross negligence standard is more practical. As
proponents of a negligence standard point out, requiring the moving party
to establish willful destruction is not always feasible in the digital world.1"
In regards to electronic data, a gross negligence standard is more in line
with the current application of the law. Even jurisdictions who require
willful or intentional misconduct recognize that "'[i]ntent is rarely proved
by direct evidence, and a district court has substantial leeway to determine
intent through consideration of circumstantial evidence, witness credibility,
motives of the witnesses in a particular case, and other factors."'2" A gross
negligence standard is consistent with the notion that courts should have
considerable latitude to determine whether a party acted with the required
level of culpability, and it does not limit courts' inherent discretion as much
as an intentional or willful standard. A gross negligence standard strikes the
balance between the varying degrees of culpability.
CONcLusioN
Despite the Sedona Conference findings and the reasoning behind Rule
37(e), courts continue to apply traditional standards from tangible discovery
to the world of electronic discovery."o' Imposing a gross negligence standard
of culpability would help alleviate the excessive cost and unique burdens
that electronic discovery often creates and would provide uniformity
among the courts. All circuits should adopt this approach with regard to
electronic discovery.
198 See Panel Discussion, supra note 8, at 7-8.
199 See Memorandum, supra note 177, at 83-89.
200 Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wade, 485 F.3d 1032, 1035 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Morris
v. Union Pac. R.R., 373 F-3d 896, 902 (8th Cir. 2004)).
201 See supra Part II.
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